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On Singular Causality: a definition and defence

The object of this paper is to offer a conception of singular causality that lies between two main views in the literature, which I take to be paradigmatically represented by David Armstrong (1997) and by Michael Tooley (1987, 1990) respectively. Armstrong maintains that there is singular causation wherever there are singular facts that instantiate causal laws; these facts are otherwise independent regularities. Tooley maintains that singular causation is independent of causal laws together with any other non-causal fact. My own view is that Armstrong’s account is too weak to conform a singularist position, as in his view singular causal relations are finally dependent on universal causation. On the other hand, Tooley’s account is too strong to be causal, as causation dissolves into a purely external and mysterious connection that is not even Humean not even regularities play a role in its establishment.
I want to maintain that there exists a middle way that correctly characterizes the spirit of singular causation, and that can be stated by (CS):

(CS) Singular causality is metaphysically independent of universal causality.

Neither Tooley nor Armstrong would admit (CS) as an appropriate defining thesis for causal singularism. In what follows, I consider different causal situations existing in the literature, with the purpose of analysing singular causation, arguing against Tooley and Armstrong´s views, and defending (CS) instead. If my reasons are accepted, Armstrong’s position, rather than being singular in spirit, results into a form of causal universalism. I will also reject Tooley’s singularism as an extreme counterintuitive form of hyperrealism. Some consequences for causation are immediate. In particular, that singular causal relations are tropes, i.e., individual relations.

I. SINGULAR CAUSATION versus LAWFUL CONNECTIONS
John Ducasse, an old causal singularist, left us this informal account of singularism: 

Causation is a relation which holds essentially between single, individual events though it may of course be generalized, and propositions containing kinds of events then be formulated. (…) The cause of a particular event [is defined] in terms of but a single occurrence of it, and thus in no way involves the supposition that it, or any like it, ever has occurred before or ever will again. The supposition of recurrence is thus wholly irrelevant to the meaning of cause. (Ducasse, 1926: 129)

Intuitively, to be a singularist is to believe that when casual relations are established, they do not need to instantiate (supervene upon, or depend on) general, universal, patterns. The occurrence of a causal fact is wholly independent of what could be true before, after, here, there or, in general of the types or classes to which the singulars in a causal fact belong. Causation is, then, universal-independent; it is a local singular matter. 
This belief should not be incompatible with the beliefs that (i) true correspondent generalizations result from singular facts, or that (ii) knowing true appropriate generalizations or laws is necessary for understanding or knowing singular causal facts, or that (iii) there are, in fact, correspondent generalizations or laws for any causal singular fact. What the causal singularist denies is that the occurrence of singular causal facts needs the existence of appropriate laws or generalizations.
Now, despite being in real essence a positive account, causal singularism is in definition a negative thesis. It is the negation of universalism for causality. This is why the words of Hume in the Enquiry could serve as a good starting point for this discussion:

When any natural object or event is presented, it is impossible for us, by any sagacity or penetration, to discover, or even conjecture, without experience, what event will result from it, or to carry our foresight beyond that object which is immediately present to the memory and senses. (…) But when one particular species of event has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other. (Hume, Enquiry VII, II, p. 49)

Hume echoes here an enduring tradition, the universalist view of causation. In general, the Humean claims that there is causation at the singular level only if, and only because, there are appropriate relations at the universal level. Singularism is the view that contradicts this conclusion. So, it would seem that (CS1), or something like (CS1), is a definitional thesis for causal singularism:

(CS1) Singular causality is metaphysically independent of nomological relations including regularities.

(CS1) states that laws do not determine the occurrence of singular causal facts. This includes the idea that the establishment of each singular causal fact in no way involves the supposition that it, or any like it, ever has occurred before or ever will. 
(CS1) seems, intuitively, a direct and correct formulation of causal singularism. It is sufficiently general and universal. It does not commit itself to any particular form of reductionism for causation. It contrasts causal singularism with accounts for causation in terms of laws but it does not commit itself to any particular account of laws. And it clearly mirrors the singularist insight that anyone can recognize in Ducasse’s words. However, it does not provide a good approach to causal singularism. In particular, one can think of cases that support (CS1) but which would not qualify as cases of singular causation. The following two ones, proposed by David Armstrong and John Carroll respectively, are situations of this kind.
This is a possible situation that Armstrong (1997) poses in defence of singularism:

Suppose that (…) a token brain-process of type C produces both a mental state of type M, which later is epiphenomenal, and also a brain-process of type D. We have two causal sequences: C  M and C  D, with M epiphenomenal, impotent. The Humean about causation (…) faces trouble. For, perhaps, the M  D regularity instantiated by the sequence of the mental event M followed by the second brain-process D, is as good a regularity as the C  D regularity instantiated by the sequence of the first brain-process followed by the second brain-process. Yet, by hypothesis, only the sequence that instantiates C  D is a causal process. (Armstrong 1997: 204) 

In this situation, the M  D regularity that is instantiated along with the causal sequences C  M and C  D is, by hypothesis, non-causal. But the Humean cannot distinguish it as such. And thus, Armstrong claims, regularities and causal relations are separable. Regularities do not constitute by themselves causal relations. So causal relations cannot be reduced to regularities. One could think, and Armstrong does, that this situation offers a case for causal singularism: we need more than, or something different from, mere regularities to be able to tell the causal relations that actually hold in the situation. 
Consider also this situation that Carroll (1994) proposes in his own defence of singularism, where the role that laws (not mere regularities) play in causation is under investigation:

Suppose some source emits particle c. Further, as happens about half the time in such cases, the emission immediately creates a Y-field enveloping c. At the same time, the emission causes c to have spin up. Then, c’s having spin up has no further effect on c that causal chain ends. The other chain continues: Because it is subject to a Y-field, c acquires positive charge. What makes this case especially interesting is the presence of two laws: It is a law that something is subject to a Y-field if and only if it simultaneously has spin up, and it is also a law that something is subject to a Y-field if and only if it immediately gets positive charge. In this example, c’s having spin up and c’s having positive charge are lawfully equivalent epiphenomena. (…) Since the former [c’s having spin up] was lawfully sufficient in the circumstances for the latter [c’s having positive charge] c’s having spin up caused c’s having positive charge [contrary to the hypothesis]. (Carroll, 1994: 127-8, original italics)

Given the laws governing the situation, the emission of c causes c’s having spin up plus a Y-field enveloping c. Being subject to a Y-field, c acquires positive charge. This means that c’s acquiring possible charge and c’s having spin up are lawfully equivalent. But, by hypothesis, there is no causal relation holding between the two events. So laws, as well as regularities, can be blind to causal relations. Both Armstrong and Carroll offer these cases in favour of singularism: That causal relations could go undetected by the laws (and regularities) that govern the situation, shows that causation is singular in nature. 
However, I think that the universalist could deal with these challenging situations in the following way. (S)he could hold that a true universalist for causation would not just attempt to account for causal facts in terms of generalizations, or in terms of (unqualified) nomological connections. Rather, a true universalist would maintain that causal facts need causal laws, causal nomological relations of the kind proposed by Dretske (1977), Tooley (1987) or Armstrong (1983, 1997) himself. And then, (s)he would say that while the relation between the emission of c and c’s having spin up, or the emission of c and the resulting Y-field enveloping c, is an instantiation of correspondent (causal) nomological relations, the relation between c’s having possitive charge and c’s having spin up is not. Equally, the sequence that instantiates C  D is a causal process because there is a nomological (causal) relation between the instantiation of C and the instantiation of D. However, there is no relation of this kind holding between the instantiation of M and the instantiation of D. The causal nomological approach would thus give the appropriate answers to the question about the causal relations that hold in both situations. 
But then (CS1) has to be strengthened, for neither Armstrong’s nor Carroll’s situation provides a case for singular causation. They do not provide a case for singular causation because in both situations the establishment of singular causal facts is still determined by relations that, even if causal, are nomological and, then, universal relations. Every singular causal state of affairs in the situations is causal because the universal causal relation occurs instantiated. This is in fact Armstrong’s position but, surprisingly, he considers himself a singularist. But, in agreement with Michael Rota’s (2009: 138) definition: if a singularist theory of causation is a theory that denies that general relations between types are more basic than singular relations between particulars, then one can hardly count Armstrong’s account into singularism. (Rota does not really clarify what he means by “singular relations”. But it seems clear to me that they have to be individual relations, i.e., what some philosophers name as relational tropes. I will be back to this in the last section of the paper.)
Michael Moore (2009: 5) has classified Armstrong’s position into singularism even if also a form of reductionism (of singular causal relations to nomological relations!). It is singularist, Moore says, because it is ontologically committed to the existence of singular causal relations. However, insofar as the universal, causal, relation is completely present in each singular causal state of affairs, and insofar as it is the presence of the universal that accounts for the causal character of the state of affairs in question, I cannot see that Armstrong is committed to the existence of singular causal relations. But if singularism is to be a substantial thesis, it has to be more than a theory committed to the occurrence of causal states of affairs or singular causal facts. Singularism is not only the truism that there are singular causal facts, or singular facts that make true causal statements.

II. CAUSAL SINGULARISM
The correction that (CS1) needs to define singular causality seems to be captured by (CS):

(CS) Singular causality is metaphysically independent of universal causality.

If (CS) is correct, causal singularism is the view that singular causal relations are such that they could go undetected by lawful connections of any kind, ranging from mere regularities to causal nomological connections. 
But now the question is, if (CS) correctly represents the thesis of causal singularism, could there be singular causation at all? Can there be causal facts such that no universal relation, including the causal universal relation, can “see”? 
Some possible situations that have been already proposed show this possibility. This is one by Douglas Ehring (2009: 44): Suppose two qualitatively indistinguishable particles, one accelerated by Sophia and one accelerated by Isabella. The laws, and we may suppose that they are causal laws, mandate that when these two particles collide at midpoint M, one of the particles disappears without trace and the other particle jumps across a spatial gap to a location E. The laws also dictate that if only one particle reaches M, then it jumps to E. Now suppose that, as a matter of fact, Sophia and Isabella accelerate their particles at the same time. Isabella’s particle disappears at M and Sophia’s particle reaches E. Sophia’s act of acceleration is the cause of the presence at E of a particle of the sort that Sophia and Isabella each accelerate. But even causal laws are blind to the causal relations that obtain.

III. SINGULAR CAUSATION  versus HYPERREALISM
At least at some point of their careers, philosophers like Tooley (1984, 1990), Woodward (1990) or Carroll (1994) have defended a version of causal singularism stronger than (CS), which Ehring has called a hyperrealist version of singular causation. This is represented by (CS2)

(CS2) Singular causality is metaphysically independent of universal causality together with any non-causal fact.

According to (CS2), causal singularism is the view that the occurrence of any singular causal fact depends merely on the singular causal relation itself, and the establishment of the singular causal relation is independent of any other relation, fact, or property, including the properties of the elements that are causally related.​[1]​ 
Tooley would write (CS2) as follows: Any two worlds W and W* that agree with respect to all of the non-causal properties of, and relations between, particular states of affairs, and with respect to all causal laws, may differ with respect to the causal relations between states of affairs (Tooley, 1990a: 173). The general idea is that indiscernible situations might differ just in their causal relations, even when they agree in causal laws.
Among other situations, Tooley proposes a type-case that would support (CS2) but not (CS). Accept that identity over time, of concrete objects, is analyzed in terms of causal relations between temporal parts:

Let P be the extended temporal part, of one particle, which consists of all temporal parts of that particle which exists at times prior to some time t, and let M be the extended temporal part that consists of all the temporal parts of it existing at t or later. Similarly, let P* and M* be the corresponding parts of the other [intrinsically indiscernible] particle. Then P is causally related to M in a way which is not to M*. (Tooley 1990a: 187-188. My italics)

The question I want to address is this: Does this situation support (CS2) but not (CS)? Does this situation support the thesis that indiscernible situations may differ only in their causal relations? I think it does not. In the situation that Tooley proposes, we have one P that causes M, and one P-indiscernible P* that causes M*, which is in turn indiscernible from M. Do we have different causal relations here? No. There is a causal relation, say, R holding between P and M, and there is one R-indiscernible causal relation R* holding between P* and M*. 
Tooley claims that causal relations are different because there is a causal relation holding between P and M, but there is no such a relation holding between P and M*. P causes M. But P does not cause M-indiscernible M*. However, as long as M* is causally related to P*, I cannot see how this case supports the thesis that indiscernible situations differ in their causal relations. Rather, it seems that the opposite holds: indiscernibles are indiscernibly causally related! 
That P is causally related to M in a way which is not to M* is the reason the Tooley offers in support of (CS2). But why should this fact support such a thesis? Of course, Tooley cannot be saying that P should be causally related to M and to M* at the same time. This would imply that a cause of M, say P, is a true cause of M only if every M-indiscernible is also the actual effect of P, which is absurd.
So maybe Tooley is saying that, even if P causes M and P-indiscernible P* causes M-indiscernible M* (and thus P does not cause M*), it could have been the case that P had caused M*. It could have been the case but it is not the case. There is a situation, say W, where P does not cause M* (because P causes M*-indiscernible M), and another possible situation W* where P does cause M*. But then, if there is a difference between W and W*, it must be a difference in the causal relations themselves. 
However, in this reading, causal relations do not differ. W and W* are wholly indiscernible. For the causal relation that holds between P and M is indiscernible from the causal relation that would hold between P and M*. Again, indiscernible situations are indiscernibly causally related. 
	So Tooley means neither of these. What he means is that, given that P causes M but not M*, it could equally have been the case that P does not cause M: It could have been the case that P causes nothing (or that P causes something totally different from M). Equally, as P does not cause M*, it could have been the case the M* is caused by nothing (or that it is caused by something totally different from P).
Do causal relations differ in this case? Yes. Obviously. But then causation becomes less than Humean! A view that holds that there could be two possible situations, one where P causes M and another where P or any intrinsically P-indiscernible is not cause of M or any intrinsically M-indiscernible, makes the causal relation quixotic and mysterious (borrowing an expression from Keith Campbell). Hyperrealism becomes, so to say, under-realism. Causal relations would be as external as spatial and temporal relations, and the concept of cause would be absolutely deprived of any sense of production or derivativeness. And, in truth, Tooley is not justified in his jumping into these radical conclusions. Rather, Tooley’s reading of the case I have just considered presupposes that causal relations hold independently of the properties of their terms. 
	(That this is the reading that Tooley intends is also supported by the consideration of other cases that he proposes in his defence of (hyper)realism (1990a, 1990b). For instance, he considers the possibility of a world with only two basic laws: (i) For any x, x’s having property P is causally sufficient to bring it about either that x has property Q or that x has property R. (ii) For any x, x’s having property S is causally sufficient to bring it about that either x has property Q or x has property R. Now suppose an object a that has both P and S, and acquires both Q and R. Was a having property P, or was a having property S the cause of its acquisition of Q and R? The causal laws, Tooley concludes, cannot tell but there certainly are some singular causal relations in the situation. 
However, it seems plain to me that to accept this situation is to presuppose, and not to argue for, the possibility that the same state of affairs (a having Q or a having R) can be caused by wholly different, if any, states of affairs (a having P, and a having S). In other words, to accept the possibility of this situation is to presuppose that the terms of causal relations can hold apart from their relation, and vice versa.
Or consider this case, also in Woodward (1990). Both Tooley and Woodward claim that the case relies on the possibility that the principle of causation is false, and on the possibility that there are indeterministic causal laws: Imagine a world where objects sometimes acquire property Q without any cause. Thus, the principle of causation does not hold true. Suppose too, that this is a law in the world: “For any x, x’s having property P causally brings it about, with probability 0.75, that x has property Q.” Now suppose that an object a has both, property P and property Q. Perhaps a has Q because it is P. Or perhaps a has acquired Q spontaneously. The law, Woodward and Tooley conclude, even if causal, cannot tell the difference; given that the causal principle does not hold universally, the law that governs the situation cannot determine which causal relations are finally established. 
However, this seems a hasty conclusion. Note that one could deny the principle of causation, and accept indeterministic causation, but at the same time deny that it is possible that a has Q independently of the causal probabilistic relation holding between P and Q. And thus x being Q is caused (with probability 0.75) by x having property P. Even if the principle of causation does not hold for every state of affairs, that x is Q is a causal state of affairs. Again, to suppose otherwise is to presuppose that the terms of causal relations can hold apart from their relation and vice versa.)

IV. CONCLUSIONS  AND SOME CONSEQUENCES 
I have argued that (CS) correctly represents the spirit of singularist causation: Singular causation is metaphysically independent of universal causation. Singularism is the view that it is possible, even if it may never be the case, that there are singular causal facts that even causal nomological relations cannot detect. (CS) is a midpoint between two other paradigmatic views on singular causation that I have rejected, i.e., that singular causality is metaphysically independent of correspondent regularities and nomological relations, and that singular causality is metaphysically independent of universal causality together with any non-causal fact. The first is too weak to count as a singularist thesis; the second too strong to count as a thesis about causality. These conclusions have some implicit consequences regarding the nature of causality itself, that I want to make explicit now.
First, in accordance with the denial of (CS1), singular causal relations are individual relations that are not particular instantiations of universals. For if the causal relation were either a universal relation, or singular causal relations were just particular instantiations of universal causation, causal singularism would amount to the triviality that there are singular causal facts, or just singular facts that make true causal statements. Thus, if in any theory of causation it is the presence of some universal that accounts for the causal character of a singular state of affairs or fact, the theory cannot count as a singularist theory of causation. Singularism is the thesis that there are, literally, singular causal relations.
Second, in accordance to the denial of (CS2), that the causal relation is individual in every causal fact does not imply that it can hold independently of the terms it relates, and vice versa that the terms have nothing to do with the relation in which they happen to stand. If causality is to remain causal, some kind of real connection, of glue, relation of production, derivativeness or the like, must be present. (I think this includes some kind of necessity liking cause and effect, but I cannot consider this complex issue here.) 
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^1	  Note that the Ehring type-situation that I have offered in support of (CS) does not necessarily support (CS2). There seems to be no reason to conclude, in that situation, that the causal relations were established independently of the elements causally related.
